Hearings of the
House Committee on Rules
H.R. 853, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999
I want to thank Chairman Dreier and the other members of the Rules Committee for holding this hearing on HR 853, the Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999, introduced by Congressman Nussle. I am proud to be a cosponsor of this legislation and glad to have the opportunity to testify here today. Since the Republicans have taken the majority, I have been a strong supporter of budget process reform. As I have said to this committee in the past, budget process reform is an essential key to reaching and maintaining a balanced budget. Passage of meaningful process reform would leave its mark on this Nation for generations to come. In the last Congress, I introduced HR 2003, the "Budget Enforcement Simplification Trust" Act, or the "BEST" bill. This legislation recognizes the need for discipline and order in making spending and revenue decisions at the federal level. I plan to reintroduce this Congress’ version of the BEST bill shortly.
There are many issues that Congressman Nussle’s bill addresses that should be central to any budget debate. For example, I support the idea of a joint resolution. A joint, rather than the current concurrent, resolution would bring the President into Congressional budget deliberations and make him accountable for its success or failure. And, because the President would have the authority to veto an unacceptable resolution, a joint resolution would require Congress to pay attention to Presidential concerns. Unlike the current budget process, this new framework would make both the Executive and the Legislative branches stakeholders in the resolution's outcome and require them to agree on overall spending and revenue levels, annual deficits, total debt levels, and on the allocation of resources among budget functions and committees.
I am also glad to see included in HR 853 the creation of a Reserve Fund which would replace the "emergency" supplemental appropriations bills which have become a catch-all for non-emergency spending schemes. Disbursements will be only for certified natural disasters with tough procedures to ensure spending on only its designed purposes. An "emergency" should not be defined as a requirement lacking budgeted funds. Congress has become too reliable on labeling increases in spending as an "emergency" designation, when in fact, the emergency at hand does not coincide with the spending levels considered.
I am also supportive of the provision in HR 853 that states the enforcement of paygo rules should be waived in any year in which the non-social security budget is in surplus, excluding Social Security surplus.
HR 853 also budgets for insurance programs on an accrual basis, which is the budget records net cost or receipts on a present value basis at the time the government commits to provide insurance. While I did not offer a similar provision in my BEST bill, I also see merit in this responsible treatment of insurance program transactions.
While Congressman Nussle’s bill, HR 853, contains many similar provisions to my BEST bill, there are differences in the two. For instance, my BEST bill would call for a biennial budgeting process, while Mr. Nussle’s bill retains the annual budget and appropriation process. Our proposals also differ in that while there is a provision in my BEST bill that would set caps on entitlement and other mandatory spending, no such provision is included in Mr. Nussle’s proposal. Lastly, while HR 853 does not address enhanced rescission, my BEST bill creates an expedited process for consideration of Presidential rescission proposals.
Despite the differences in our proposals, there are many similarities and common goals set forth between our proposals. For this reason, I am here today in support of Mr. Nussle and his efforts in HR 853.
Conclusions
The federal budget process is decentralized with a vengeance. Too many Executive branch agencies, too many Congressional Committees and subcommittees, go through too many steps each year, until it seems that no decision on spending and tax policy ever is final. The process is replete with duplication, overlap and redundancy. Complexity compounded by confusion undermines accountability. We speak of so-called "uncontrollable spending" as if those federal outlays resulted from natural laws rather than statutes enacted right here on Capitol Hill.
It is time to make government and the budget process more accountable and use public accountability to encourage Congress and the President to live up to the promises made in the budget process every year. As we consider budget process reform, we should keep the following points in mind:
- We need to be concerned about government accountability. The polling booth is the market clearing house of democracy. When government becomes so complex that concerned voters, willing to spend a reasonable amount of time, cannot understand the Federal budget, the system breaks down.
- Public accountability is the most effective instrument we know to ensure government accountability. Congress and the Administration often fail to live within the budgets we currently adopt. It should be more difficult not to live up to what we promise.
This system will work because our constituents will understand it. And that is where public accountability comes into play. Nothing here would keep Congress and the President from "busting the budget". But if we do bust the budget, under this system, the media will know and our constituents will understand, whom to hold accountable. That is the best, most healthy kind of enforcement mechanism in our system of government.
