Mr. Chairman, Mr. Moakley, Members of the Rules Committee -- thank you for giving me this opportunity to offer you my thoughts on biennial budgeting.

First, let me commend you for holding these hearings. I believe biennial budgeting holds real promise for improving the operations of government. I am pleased that its potential is being examined closely by this committee. I am also encouraged by the support that has been given by Members on both sides of the aisle to Chairman Dreier's sense of the House resolution in support of biennial budgeting.

In 1993, I served as co-chairman with Chairman Dreier, as well as Senators David Boren and Pete Domenici, on the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. One of the main recommendations we made for reforming the Congress was to adopt biennial budgeting. Although that recommendation was not then adopted by Congress, I believe that it remains sound.

There are both pluses and minuses to biennial budgeting, but overall I think it would improve government operations -- primarily because of its potential to free up Members' time for important work that is now being squeezed out by competing pressures. Biennial budgeting is not a cure-all for every obstacle to the efficient functioning of government. We must not have exaggerated expectations of what it can do. However, moving to biennial budgeting would create greater budget and program stability, strengthen programmatic oversight and promote more long-range strategic thinking.

By not having to pass a new budget every year, Congress would have more time to review how laws are working, and the executive branch and state and local governments would have a more stable budget environment to plan and carry out their programs. During the second year of a two-year budget cycle, Congress would still have to spend some time adjusting or supplementing the budget for changing conditions or unforeseen events, but overall it would be able to focus more on identifying problem areas in government operations and looking ahead to the policy needs of the next biennium and beyond.

The current appropriations process is too cumbersome and time-consuming. Senate Majority Leader Lott has estimated that Congress is now spending two-thirds of its time on the budget and appropriations. That is simply too much. It seems Congress is in a perpetual budget cycle, with budget crises nearly every year. The deadlines for the budget process are rarely met -- Congress has met the deadline for completion of the budget resolution only four times during the 26 year history of the Budget Act -- and appropriations bills end up being dumped into enormous omnibus bills which are, from the standpoint of good process, if not content, abominations. The authorization committees are often simply bypassed. Members also have little time for non-budget activities because Congress is working a reduced schedule, with most congressional business taking place only between Tuesday and Thursday for much of the year. This process does not serve the American people well.

Biennial budgeting would help remedy some of these problems. It would allow the authorizing committees -- where the greatest policy expertise lies -- to regain some of their lost influence. It would give Congress more time in the second year to resolve policy differences, fostering a smoother budget process in the subsequent year and potentially reducing the number of controversial policy riders attached to appropriation measures. These changes could markedly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Congress.

For the executive branch and state and local governments, biennial budgeting would mean more budget predictability and program stability, enabling them to use their funding more efficiently, focus more on program implementation and plan farther in advance. The levels of the vast majority of federal funding are predictable. They do not change dramatically from year to year. Biennial budgeting would reduce the amount of documents agencies must produce and the number of times administration officials must testify to justify their budget requests.

Some opponents of biennial budgeting argue that it would take control over programs away from the Congress in the second year and thereby reduce government accountability. But Congress would retain the capacity to enact supplemental spending measures in the non-budget year to deal with unforeseen problems. This flexibility would allow Congress to react to new developments and remain in control of the purse strings. Moreover, if oversight is performed rigorously, Congress will be monitoring the operations of government agencies and programs more closely than it currently does.

So let me turn to two of the most important reasons for adopting biennial budgeting: to strengthen congressional oversight and encourage long-term strategic thinking.

Oversight

Oversight of how effectively the executive branch is carrying out congressional mandates is an enormously important function of Congress. It is at the very core of good government. Congress must do more than write the laws; it must make sure that the administration is carrying out those laws the way Congress intended.

That is why I was frequently frustrated during my years in Congress by the small amount of time available for conducting oversight. On many committees I served on, I would have liked to do much more oversight, but we simply did not have time for it because of the various other demands of the job. As the pressures of fund-raising, media attention, and working out the budget and appropriations have increased over the years, programmatic oversight has declined. Biennial budgeting would not take away all of these competing pressures, but it would give committees more time overall to pursue rigorous oversight of programs and agencies. Congress would be able to focus greater attention on how federal funds are being spent.

Oversight has many purposes:

• to make sure programs conform to congressional intent;

•  

• to ensure that programs and agencies are administered in a cost-effective, efficient manner;

   

• to ferret out (in the oft-heard phrase) "waste, fraud, and abuse";

   

• to see whether programs may have outlived their usefulness;

   

• and to compel an explanation or justification of policy.

  Oversight can sometimes get off-track -- becoming excessively partisan and focused on personal investigations and possible scandals rather than programmatic review. But when done properly, oversight is one of the most important and effective tools of Congress.

  Oversight can protect the country from the imperial presidency and from bureaucratic arrogance. It can expose and prevent misconduct, and maintain a degree of constituency influence in an administration. The responsibility of oversight is to look into every nook and cranny of government affairs, uncover wrongdoing and put the light of publicity to it.

  Congress needs a large number of oversight methods to hold agencies accountable because different methods have their own strengths and weaknesses. Periodic reauthorization, personal visits by Members or staff, review by the General Accounting Office or inspectors general, subpoenas, and reports from the executive branch can all be useful. The authorization, appropriations, and governmental affairs committees, as well as special ad hoc committees, can all play important roles in oversight.

  In many ways Congress underestimates its power in oversight. Agencies start to get a little nervous whenever someone from Congress starts poking around, and that is probably to the good overall. Federal bureaucracies do not stay on their toes unless they expect review and oversight from Congress.

  My personal belief is that conducting oversight is every bit as important as passing legislation. President Woodrow Wilson thought that "the informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function." Our founding fathers clearly recognized that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty".

  A strong record of congressional oversight -- of "continuous watchfulness" -- will do a lot to restore public confidence in the institution. It will show that Congress is taking its responsibilities seriously and is able to work constructively to improve government performance.

  That is why I am encouraged by the efforts of Speaker Hastert, Chairman Dreier and others to have the House return to its traditional programmatic oversight functions.

  Moving to biennial budgeting would give oversight a significant boost by freeing up the committee workloads over the two-year cycle.

  Strategic thinking

  Biennial budgeting would also free up time that could be used by Congress and the executive branch to focus more on long-term strategic thinking -- examining the challenges our country will face over the coming decades.

  Some years ago a careful observer of Congress advised me that the worst thing about congressional service was that Members never have time to put their feet on their desks, look out the window, and think about the long-range needs of the country. I have come to appreciate the wisdom of that remark.

  The federal government simply does not do enough long-term thinking. It may be unavoidable that policymakers focus mainly on urgent problems, headlines and crises, but far too little attention is given to challenges that lie just over the horizon. Federal programs that involve long-term investments -- for infrastructure, research and development, and education -- are dwarfed by federal spending for current needs and consumption. In contrast to the strategic, long-term planning of most businesses, there is typically little systematic discussion in Congress of the most important long-term challenges facing our nation.

  These challenges are numerous: What are our long-term national security needs? How can we maintain a prosperous and open economy well into the future? How can we make sure Americans will have the skills they need to succeed in that economy? What long-term environmental challenges -- both domestic and international -- will we face? What problems will be posed by the growth of information technology, biotechnology and genetic engineering? How can we ensure that we will continue to have adequate food and energy supplies? What will America's changing demographic make-up -- which, 25 years from now, will include a much higher proportion of older Americans, Latinos and other non-whites -- mean for our political, economic and social life? What will be the consequences of continued or growing global economic inequality?

  Certainly some work is done by Congress -- and done well -- on long-term issues. Committees hold hearings on topics ranging from human cloning to the baby-boomer Social Security crunch to future terrorist threats. But overall, I believe Congress should be doing much more. If we fail to adequately address these long-range questions, we may miss opportunities and overlook steps we should be taking today that could make tomorrow's problems far more manageable.

  Looking carefully at the challenges of the future is not esoteric speculation or crystal ball-gazing. Many future challenges are predictable. I recently met with one of our country's top demographers, who laid out a variety of changes that are likely to flow from the increased immigration of recent decades. The CIA, recognizing the importance of looking at future challenges, is now working to free up more of its analysts' time for future studies, and is reaching out to tap the long-range thinking of more academics and private sector experts.

  Congress does have some stipulations for long-term thinking. Since 1974, the House has required committees to "undertake futures research and forecasting" on matters within their jurisdiction. The Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office are authorized to undertake anticipatory research.

  But Congress remains predominately focused on short-term needs, in part because the one-year budget cycle leaves congressional committees with little time to look ahead.

  To bolster long-range strategic thinking, it might be helpful to require committees to report regularly on their work looking at emerging trends and long-term challenges. It might also be helpful to require the President to report every few years on the critical challenges facing the nation in future decades.

  One of the initiatives I have begun at the Wilson Center is to develop a coordinated focus on examining future domestic and international challenges. As we launch this initiative, we will be recruiting scholars to help identify the emerging challenges most in need of attention and the top thinkers and practitioners who can propose approaches and solutions to them. The Center would be pleased to be of help to Members and congressional staff on these issues in any way it can.

  I also encourage Congress to make use of the great resources of the Congressional Research Service, which can provide excellent forecasts of future trends and challenges. [Attached to this testimony as an example of this kind of forecast is a copy of an outstanding report on future trends written by Walter Oleszek of CRS in 1998.]

  The point of this kind of long-term thinking is not that the federal government could, or should, resolve all of America's long-term problems, but that we should at least be considering these issues and examining how best to deal with them.

  Moving to biennial budgeting would allow Congress to focus on America's future challenges much more than it currently does.

  Conclusion

  Biennial budgeting will not resolve all of the problems in the budget process and the operations of government, but I believe it will improve the effectiveness of government by providing a more stable budget environment and allowing for a greater focus on oversight and long-range thinking.

  I look forward to answering any of your questions.

  Thank you.
  
  

  Back to Testimony Page