Hearings of the
Committee on Rules
"Biennial Budgeting: A Tool for Improving Government Fiscal Management and Oversight"
The Honorable Lee Hamilton,
Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center
As I mentioned in my testimony, I strongly believe that moving to biennial budgeting would give oversight a significant boost by freeing up the committee workload over the two-year cycle.
Oversight of how effectively the Executive Branch is carrying out congressional mandates is an enormously important function of Congress. Congress must make sure that the administration is carrying out laws the way Congress intended.
Biennial bugeting would also free up time that could be used by Congress and the Executive Branch to focus more on long-term strategic thinking – examining the challenges our country will face over the coming decades. Congress's efforts in long-term thinking in the off-year could be significantly aided by requiring the President to submit a report every few years on the long-term challenges facing the country.
In these two ways, biennial budgeting could improve the effectiveness of government by providing a more stable budget environment and allowing for a greater focus on oversight and long-range thinking.
1. Is the current lack of time the reason for inadequate oversight or is it that Members aren't interested in doing oversight regardless? Are additional process changes needed to remedy this?
Time is only part of the problem. The key is leadership and the will of individual Members. Structural reforms can be helpful, but for oversight to really work it takes a clear message from congressional leadership that oversight is a priority and that it will be done in a bipartisan, coordinated, systematic way. The key role of the House Speaker, the Senate Majority Leader and the Minority Leaders cannot be overstated.
The will of individual Members to do oversight will ultimately depend on incentives and rewards to do the necessary work. Perhaps a better coordination between party and committee leaders on the existing oversight agenda requirement would produce more meaningful agendas that are more the result of a committee process. The more Members feel they are part of the larger project and play a role in devising it, the more they will be inclined to make it succeed.
2. Will biennial budgeting degenerate into a more ad hoc annual process with frequent revisions and more supplementals? Are there procedural changes that can prevent this from happening?
Any new process can produce unintended consequences. Though it is tempting to limit the number of supplementals, this would defeat the purpose of truly emergency supplementals needed to deal expeditiously with unexpected needs resulting from disasters, war, etc. It is clear that supplementals are increasingly being used for non-emergency matters and to circumvent the spending caps. Leadership controls and presidential veto threats remain the best safeguards against allowing these trends to get out of control.
3. How can the problem of revised projections be effectively integrated into a biennial system?
Ideally, if you are going to plan on a supplemental in the second session, the President's revised estimates should be sent to Congress no later than June 1 so that any supplemental spending could be acted on by the July or August recesses.
4. What role would reconciliation play under a biennial process, especially in the off-year?
Reconciliation should not be done in an off-year unless it is needed for emergency purposes. In election years, too many games will be played with it to either increase entitlement spending and/or cut taxes. It should be dealt with as a follow-on to the budget resolution's implementation, in the first session.
5. What role does the authorization process currently play in the budget process and should that role change? Will a changing role for authorizing committees improve programmatic oversight?
Generally, I favor an increased role for authorization committees, which under the present system are often simply bypassed. Under biennial budgeting, authorizers could submit their estimates to the budget committee for the upcoming biennium. The real problem will be projecting what the need will be three and four years into the future. While authorizers will be forced by biennial budgeting to think three and four years out, they will also be able to spend less time guessing at authorizing ceilings and more time focusing on how well existing polices and programs are designed and being implemented. The need for fine tuning and for occasionally passing new program in odd-years will decrease if authorizers focus more on devising far-sighted authorizing policies based on better policy oversight and long-range thinking. An increased role for authorizing committees should improve programmatic oversight because they possess the greatest expertise and capacity to rigorously monitor and oversee various government programs.
