Hearing of the
Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process
on Biennial Budgeting
Thank you Madame Chairman for holding this hearing and allowing me to share my concerns with biennial budgeting.
As a member of the Appropriations committee and a former member of the Budget Committee, I sit here today with unique insight on this issue. I have seen both processes at work, and know firsthand the challenges that both appropriators and budgeters face. And while much of the dissatisfaction with the budget process in recent years has been the result of divided control of the Congress and the Executive Branch, it is unlikely that a shift to biennial budgeting would have made any difference. Nor should we let the frustrations of the past few years push us to a system that may not work.
We must ask ourselves what are we trying to accomplish here and if this is the most effective way to accomplish that goal. Simply, biennial budgeting is not the answer.
Biennial budgeting could jeopardize the very thing that many in Congress hold most dear-preserving the surplus for debt reduction, tax relief and other pressing needs. As we all know, budget projections invariably rise and fall with economic trends, emergencies and other factors that are outside Congress' immediate control. For example, over the last four years CBO incorrectly estimated the deficit or surplus for the upcoming fiscal year by an average of $99.5 billion.
Given these inevitable fluctuations of economy and federal revenues, Congress needs every tool at its disposal to ensure there are sufficient surpluses each year to meet its target for tax relief and debt reduction. The budget resolution provides the framework to make year-by-year changes in entitlement programs, tax policy, and discretionary spending levels. Only through actually passing appropriation bills can discretionary levels be changed. In the case of entitlement reforms, the budget resolution can protect these measures from a filibuster. Welfare reform might never have reached the President's desk had it been considered in the second session of the 104th Congress under biennial budgeting, because it passed the Senate in 1995 by a mere 52 to 47.
One of the supposed advantages of biennial budgeting is allowing additional time to focus on oversight. Ironically, biennial budgeting would actually reduce oversight. The most practical oversight is accomplished through the appropriations process when the agencies are dependent on Congress for more funding in the near term. While the Appropriations Committee would continue to hold oversight hearings during the second session, they would lack the threat of an appropriation reduction for agencies that fail to adhere to authorizing statutes, consult with Congress on agency operations, or meet performance goals.
Further, with no regular appropriation bills in the second session, Congress would be forced to consider massive supplemental bills or correction bills to take care of changing priorities, unanticipated events, and emergencies. Supplementals tend to be more directly under the control of the Leadership, which means less member input and oversight.
Not only will biennial budgeting make it tough to keep the budget in balance, it could also eliminate any hope for tax relief in election years. If the budget resolution includes an instruction to the Ways and Means and Finance Committees to report a tax bill, it is protected in the Senate from a filibuster. Any tax bill that was not reconciled by the budget resolution from the previous year will effectively need 60 votes to pass the Senate. This is a high hurdle for those who came to Congress with a mandate to provide tax relief for American families.
I am aware that several of my colleagues have had positive experiences with biennial budgeting in their state legislatures. However, the current trend among states is a shift towards annual budgeting. Currently 30 states budget on an annual basis with 26 states dropping biennial budgeting in favor of annual budgeting over the last 40 years. In addition, unlike states Congress must necessarily address a myriad of both domestic and international issues. This broad array of responsibilities requires attention every year.
I also have strong concerns that biennial budgeting would cede power from the House to the Senate and the Administration. Senate rules allow endless amendments to supplemental appropriations bills, giving Senators great flexibility in off-years. Senators would experience three budget cycles before facing re-election. Members of Congress would write appropriations bills only in the early months of a term and would be fiscal "lame ducks" thereafter, subject to the will of the Administration or forcing sporadic supplemental measures. The House must act responsibly and not cede power to the Senate or the Administration.
Madame Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to express my concerns today. I hope we have the opportunity to explore and understand the consequences of this issue fully before rushing this legislation through the House.
