1. You suggest possibly including a sunset provision for biennial budgeting. How long would you argue would it take before we could assess whether the new process is working? What would be the criteria you would use to judge its success or failure? Do you have any thoughts on another suggestion that has been made that we should consider implementing biennia budgeting on a pilot basis just for certain segments of the budget?

I believe the wisest course is to begin on a pilot basis, by targeting programs which have reasonably predictable spending patterns, have broad political support, and could profit from longer-term budget horizons. Among the candidates would be a substantial part of the defense budget and biomedical research. Indeed, the annual defense authorization and appropriations bills now consume much executive and congressional energy.

If you decide to go forward with a comprehensive biennial budgeting process, I would sunset it after two cycles, or a total of four years. An evaluation should look at whether the off-year supplemental appropriations process expands significantly, whether the total amount of floor time on budget and appropriations matters declines, the accuracy of longer budget projections, changes in the quantity and quality of congressional oversight by appropriators and authorizers, whether time of executive branch personnel is freed up and, if so, how that time is reallocated, and if there is any noticeable change in the level of political friction between the branches and in the amount of long-term deliberation in both branches.

"a strong record of congressional oversight - of ‘continuous watchfulness' - will do a lot to restore public confidence in the institution. It will show that Congress is taking its responsibilities seriously and is able to work constructively to improve government performance."

I take Lee Hamilton at his word that he wishes he had had more time for oversight. I just don't see how a biennial budget process would free up that time. Lee's broad substantive interests and responsibilities, and the demands of individuals and groups to meet with him, would not have been measurably diminished by a biennial budget process. My argument is that congressional oversight is a consequence both of serious policy interests and responsibilities of Members and political motivations, not of the amount of time consumed by the budget and appropriations process.

3. You suggest that requiring longer term projections to support a two-year budget cycle would "invite partisan and ideological mischief." Could you elaborate and provide examples of what you mean?

I believe that OMB and CBO would do their best to provide accurate projections but the unavoidable errors would lead Members to have less confidence in those numbers and to substitute their own, which would naturally pull them into pitched partisan and ideological battles. Budget gimmicks would, I believe, multiply.

4. What means would you suggest we explore in order to improve House-Senate cooperation in the budget process? Do you have some specific ideas you could offer us?

Improving House-Senate comity, especially on budget and appropriations matters, is a desirable but illusive goal. Senator Lott's recent decision to table the supplemental appropriations bill against the wishes of the House and of Senate appropriators demonstrates the difficulty here. I wish I had some concrete proposals for you to consider but I do not. All I can suggest is more regular consultations between party and committee leaders in both branches.

5. What role do you see the authorization process currently playing in the budget process and do you think that role should change? Do you think changing or strengthening its role would improve the role and condition of programmatic oversight?

Authorizing committees have responsibility for problem exploration, agenda setting, policy analysis, program design, deliberation to reconcile diverse and often competing interests on legislative matters under their purview, monitoring implementation, program evaluation, and reauthorization. The budget process is designed to set the broad parameters for revenues and expenditures while the appropriations process examines how the dollars are actually spent. Difficulties arise when each of these separate processes intrudes on the other. Annual authorizations become de facto appropriations bills. Authorizing provisions in appropriations bills crowd out the substantive committees. The challenge is to recognize the comparative advantage of each process and to build incentives for each to stick to its advantage.