Hearings of the
Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process
The Rescissions Process After the Line Item Veto: Tools for Controlling Spending
Sylvia Mathews
Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget
1. Please describe the decision-making process that occurs within the Administration in determining which rescissions to propose to Congress and the timing for presentation of those proposals.
As part of the development of the President's Budget, and throughout the fiscal year, OMB works with the agencies to identify funding levels that are in excess of that needed for carrying out an agency mission, as well as funding that relates to low-priority activities. Under the discretionary budget caps, the rescission of excess funding or funding for low-priority activities can enable higher-priority activities to be funded. Rescission proposals are transmitted to the Congress in the President’s Budget, in requests for supplemental appropriations, and as separate matters.
2. Your testimony notes that the rescissions process can be used to identify spending that serves a special interest rather than the national interest. How do you define “special interest”?
Determining whether a particular spending item is in the national interest, or serves only a special interest, requires a case-by-case evaluation of the merits of each item. For purposes of the enhanced rescission process, “special interest” means something that is not in the national interest. While the number of beneficiaries and type of benefit are relevant, they are not necessarily determinative. As we discussed in the line item veto process, sometimes there are things that benefit few people but are in the national interest. In the enhanced rescission process, the President would recommend the rescission of items that he believes are not in the National interest, and Congress would make the final determination through an up or down vote.
3. During the period that the President had at his disposal both the Line Item Veto authority and the existing rescission tool, what determinations were made by the Administration in deciding which tool to apply in particular cases?
The Line Item Veto Act was in effect for only 18 months, from January 1997 through June 1998. The Act therefore applied only to a limited number of bills -- the appropriations bills for Fiscal Year 1998 as well as the Balanced Budget and Taxpayer Relief Acts of 1997. Given the limited time that the Line Item Veto was in effect, no criteria were established for deciding when the President would use his Line Item Veto authority as opposed to his existing rescission authority. However, many of the President's cancellations under the Line Item Veto Act were at the project level. By contrast, Presidential rescission proposals have typically had a broader scope, and do not address individual projects. In addition, I should note that under the Line Item Veto Act, the President had only five days, after signing a bill, in which to identify items for cancellation, whereas the President may submit rescission proposals at any time.
4. You mentioned in your testimony the separate enrollment approach to achieving the goals of the Line Item Veto Act. Does the Administration support such an approach? Some have argued that separate enrollment is too cumbersome. Could this type of process by made to work?
Under the “separate enrollment” approach, the enrolling clerks in the House and Senate would be required to separately enroll each covered item in a bill. Each of these individual, separately-enrolled bills would then be presented to the President, who could exercise his constitutional veto authority with respect to any one, or all, of them. For each separately-enrolled provision that the President vetoed, Congress would be required to override the veto by a two-thirds vote in each House if it wanted to preserve the provision.
When the “separate enrollment” approach was being discussed, prior to the enactment of the Line Item Veto Act, questions were raised about whether “separate enrollment” was practical in light of the number of separate spending items that are contained in a typical appropriations bill. This type of approach has never been tried before, and it would likely pose insurmountable logistical problems for both the Congress and the President in administering it. Moreover, the President under the “separate enrollment” approach would be given even less time to act than under the Line Item Veto Act. The President under the Line Item Veto Act had five days after signing an appropriations bill into law to decide which spending items, if any, to cancel in the bill. By contrast, the President under the “separate enrollment” approach would have to make his decision before he signs “the appropriations bill” into law. That is because, for each individual spending item, he would have to decide whether to sign that separately-enrolled bill into law or instead to veto it.
5. Your written testimony emphasizes that strengthening the current process by requiring that Congress vote on the President’s rescissions proposals would increase accountability for both the Legislative and Executive Branches. In what way do you view this process as increasing accountability for the President? Is it your view that, if the President knew that Congress would be required to vote on his proposed rescissions, the process by which those rescissions are chosen would change in any way from the current process?
As I indicated in my testimony, enhanced rescission authority would increase the accountability of both branches. By requiring that Congress vote on the President’s proposals, enhanced rescission would increase the ability of Congress to review individual spending programs tucked away in large appropriations bills. At the same time, enhanced rescission would increase the accountability of the President. Currently, the President must either accept wasteful spending or else veto an entire appropriations bill. Enhanced rescission would give the President a meaningful alternative – submitting rescission proposals that Congress would be required to vote “up or down” on. I cannot say at this time whether the process for identifying spending for rescission would change if Congress gave the President enhanced rescission authority. However, it would seem reasonable to assume that a President would give greater weight to his rescission authority, and would be more likely to submit rescission proposals, if Congress were required to vote on his proposals.
