Hearings of the
House Committee on Rules
H.R. 853, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999
MR. CHAIRMAN, EVER SINCE THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT BECAME LAW IN 1974, PEOPLE HAVE BLAMED IT EVERY TIME THEY DON’T GET THEIR WAY.
IF ANYONE IS TO BLAME, IT’S THE ACTORS, NOT THE ACT. THE BUDGET ACT CAN ONLY SET UP INCENTIVES TO DO THE RIGHT THING, IT CANNOT FORCE A MAJORITY OF HOUSE MEMBERS TO MAKE BUDGET DECISIONS AGAINST THEIR WILL.
MR. CHAIRMAN, THE BILL WE ARE DISCUSSING TODAY MAKES 3 MAJOR CHANGES IN THE BUDGET ACT – ALL OF WHICH I OPPOSE.
FIRST, THIS BILL GUTS THE PAY-GO RULE. UNDER CURRENT LAW, ENTITLEMENT INCREASES AND TAX CUTS MUST BE PAID FOR. THIS BILL SAYS YOU DON’T HAVE TO PAY FOR TAX CUTS OR ENTITLEMENT INCREASES IF THERE IS A SURPLUS. THIS PROVISION ENCOURAGES MEMBERS TO RUSH TO SPEND THE SURPLUS BEFORE ANYONE ELSE CAN USE IT. ANY HOPE OF RESERVING THE SURPLUS FOR DEBT REDUCTION WILL BE TOTALLY LOST. SO, THE RESOURCES WE COULD BE USING TO FIX SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE WILL PROBABLY BE USED INSTEAD TO PAY FOR A TAX CUT.
SECOND, THE AUTOMATIC CONTINUING RESOLUTION WILL SET A PERMANENT APPROPRIATIONS LEVEL. THIS WILL ENCOURAGE MEMBERS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE REGULAR APPROPRIATIONS BILLS AND THE AUTOMATIC CONTINUING RESOLUTION.
THIRD, THE JOINT BUDGET RESOLUTION AND FALLBACK WILL CREATE MORE INCENTIVES FOR POLITICAL POSTURING AND DELAY.
LET’S FACE IT, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET RESOLUTION AND THE PRESIDENT’S BUDGET ARE BOTH POLITICAL DOCUMENTS. AS LONG AS ONE PARTY CONTROLS THE CONGRESS AND ONE PARTY CONTROLS THE WHITE HOUSE, THERE WON’T BE MUCH NEGOTIATION ON A BUDGET RESOLUTION. NO ONE HAS ANY REASON TO COMPROMISE AT SUCH AN EARLY STAGE. BUT, IF MEMBERS CAN SEE THE FALLBACK AND IF THEY KNOW THE AUTOMATIC CONTINUING RESOLUTION IS IN PLACE, THE MAJORITY HAS EVERY REASON TO PASS A BUDGET THAT FORCES A PRESIDENTIAL VETO AND DELINEATES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PARTIES.
ON RELATED MATTER, I AGREE WITH MY COLLEAGUES THAT THE 1997 CHANGES TO THE SYSTEM FOR DESIGNATING EMERGENCY SPENDING IS IN SHAMBLES BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THESE ARE THE WAYS TO FIX THEM. I OBJECT TO THE EXTRAORDINARY POWER GRANTED TO THE BUDGET COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN TO DETERMINE WHAT CONSTITUTES AN EMERGENCY AND I FIND THE DEFINITION OF EMERGENCY UNREALISTIC. FOR EXAMPLE, KOSOVO IS NEITHER SUDDEN NOT UNANTICIPATED BUT IT CERTAINLY IS AN EMERGENCY.
NOR DO I BELIEVE THIS APPROPRIATIONS LOCK-BOX PROPOSAL WILL WORK ANY BETTER THAN LOCK-BOX PROPOSALS IN THE PAST. EVERYONE AGREES THE APPROPRIATIONS CAPS ARE WORKING WELL, MAYBE A LITTLE TOO WELL, AND I DON’T THINK WE NEED ANY MORE DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON APPROPRIATIONS.
MR. CHAIRMAN, THERE ARE A HANDFUL OF SMALLER IDEAS IN THIS BILL, SOME OF WHICH ARE GOOD – SUCH AS MR. CARDIN’S PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE BUDGET TREATMENT OF INSURANCE PROGRAMS AND, OF COURSE, MY PROPOSAL TO MAKE UNREPORTED MEASURES SUBJECT TO BUDGET ACT POINTS OF ORDER.
BUT SOME OF THE SMALLER IDEAS ARE DANGEROUS – SUCH AS THE DEFINITION OF POCKET VETO. THIS DEFINITION IMPLIES, CONTRARY TO THE LONG-STANDING VIEW OF THE HOUSE, THAT ONLY THIS NEW BUDGET JOINT RESOLUTION CANNOT BE POCKET VETOED DURING A RECESS.
MR. CHAIRMAN, DESPITE THE INCLUSION OF MR. CARDIN’S AND MY PROPOSALS, THIS BILL CONTAINS A LOT OF DANGEROUS CHANGES TO OUR BUDGET PROCESS. WE SHOULD EITHER LEAVE WELL ENOUGH ALONE OR GO BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD.
THANK YOU.
