Hearings of the
House Committee on Rules
H.R. 853, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999
Timothy J. Muris
Foundation Professor, George Mason University School of Law
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H.R. 853's proposal to give the budget the force of law by creating a joint budget resolution is predicated on the premise that early agreement on aggregates will produce a smoother and more efficient process. Your testimony touches on this point in suggesting that you think this is a worthwhile change in the existing process.
Based on your experiences at OMB, what is your assessment of the validity of that premise? Do you think that we have gotten the formula for the joint budget resolution model right?
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What is your assessment of the bill’s provision of a fall-back to a concurrent resolution if the President vetoes the joint budget resolution?
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 2:
I support the joint resolution because Executive-Legislative negotiation over the totals is a step toward exercising more control over the entire budget. After all, the federal government does not even have a “budget” in the sense that most states do. I do not know whether this change will produce a better process in a procedural sense. In any event, the fall back procedures if the president vetoes the resolution will mitigate against procedural chaos.
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You boldly suggest that entitlement status should be ended for all entitlements except those that are earned, such as Social Security.
How would you go about implementing this type of sunsetting without subjecting Congress to the charge that it is reneging on commitments it has made to provide certain benefits?
ANSWER:
Because recipients contribute to “earned” entitlements, I believe the “fairness” point has some merit for these programs. For other programs, such an argument does not exist. Moreover, the fiscal health of the country should be our paramount concern.
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What would be your recommendations for the “penalties” you allude to in your testimony in the event that Congress fails to reauthorize programs on a periodic basis?
ANSWER:
A penalty of stopping these programs without authorization is too great. It would discourage program changes in all but extreme circumstances. A penalty of a small reduction from the previous year’s level - e.g. 10 percent - would encourage needed modifications. (For programs that require modifications to increase spending, there is no need for additional incentives - under the current system, increases are the norm).
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Your testimony includes a footnote regarding the Byrd rule and reconciliation bills – you propose a modification of the Byrd rule with respect to the baseline.
Could you elaborate on this suggestion? Do you have any further guidance for us about how to deal with the disparity the Byrd rule creates between the House and Senate in negotiations over budget-related legislation?
ANSWER:
I would modify the Byrd rule to make program expansions much more difficult. The Houses’ concerns with the Byrd Rule could be addressed in part by simplifying the rule and by codifying its interpretations.
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H.R. 853 attempts to define an “emergency” for which funds may be assigned from the reserve fund the bill creates. These criteria provide parameters for the term “unanticipated” including “sudden,” “urgent,” “unforeseen” and “temporary.”
What is your view of the criteria that have been enumerated in H.R. 853 for “emergency” spending?
ANSWER:
No set of criteria alone will necessarily solve the problems. The bill’s criteria are appropriate, and coupled with the other provisions, help address this loophole to the caps.
