Hearing of the
Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process
on Biennial Budgeting
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Frost, and members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify on a very important institutional issue. Let me offer three reasons why we should resist the siren's call of biennial budgeting.
First, biennial budgeting weakens Congress's power to shape national priorities and hold the executive accountable. Biennial budgets would weaken the best instrument Congress has for claiming full partnership with the executive branch in shaping national policy: the power of the purse. Members of Congress would write appropriations bills only in the early months of a term and would be fiscal "lame ducks" thereafter, reduced to seeking sufferance from executive agencies and/or trying to put together sporadic supplemental appropriations measures. By the time another appropriations bill was debated, some members would retire, an election would be held, and committee memberships would change. That would weaken Congressional authority, and embolden the executive. We should protect the legitimate powers of the entire Congress. Supporters of biennial budgeting like to note that the four most recent presidents--George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George H.W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan--all have supported biennial budgeting. If their support indicates that biennial budgeting is not a partisan issue, it should warn us that it is an institutional issue.
Second, oversight without the power to reduce or increase appropriations is oversight without teeth. Some advocates of biennial appropriating claim that it would give Congress more time and strengthen our incentives for oversight. Surely the most careful oversight Congress gives the executive branch is through the annual appropriations process when agency budgets, performance, and needs are reviewed, program by program, line by line. Without the need to produce an annual appropriations bill, oversight loses its bite. Moreover, biennial budgeting would not give authorizing committees more time to conduct rigorous oversight. Authorizing committees don't pass appropriations bills and already have the power to conduct oversight.
And, finally, Congress already has the power to enact multi-year budget plans. It is important to distinguish multi-year budget plans--such as those in 1990, 1993, and 1997--from biennial budgeting and appropriating. Multi-year budget plans have been important instruments of advance planning and fiscal discipline; unlike biennial budgeting, multi-year budget plans don't weaken Congress's hand in shaping national priorities and holding the executive accountable.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe biennial budgeting would weaken Congress's power and performance in both budgeting and oversight. Thank you again for the chance to share my concerns with you and the Committee.
