Hearing of the
Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process
on Biennial Budgeting
Madame Chair, Subcommittee members, thank you for the opportunity to address you this morning on a topic of particular concern to me and of true importance to this institution.
There are obvious problems with the existing Congressional budget process. It begins in January, yet rarely is a budget plan or outline produced until well into the legislative year. It requires debate and deliberation at the Budget Committee level, requires debate and deliberation at the authorizing committee level, and requires debate and deliberation at the Appropriations level.
Many proposals have been put forth recently that aim to streamline the process and eliminate delay, yet few will have the impact desired. The proposal to adopt a biennial budget process would, in my opinion, place severe constraints on Congress' increasingly difficult ability to effectively exercise its Constitutional powers with respect to revenue and spending.
Make no mistake about it. Biennial budgeting would hamper Congress' ability to provide oversight to the executive branch, and this institution would cede a great deal of its budgetary power to the Senate.
First, biennial budgeting will weaken Members' ability to influence administrative policy. Budgetary decisions would be made early into a Congressional term, providing limited opportunity afterward to hold federal agencies accountable if funds are not expended as determined. In effect, elected Members of Congress will transfer a great deal of their power to influence public policy over to career bureaucrats.
We're elected by our friends and neighbors back home to serve as a watchdog of sorts to the goings on of the Washington bureaucracy. Biennial budgeting would restrict our regular ability to influence policy by limiting our input to once every two calendar years. Instead of watch dogs, we would become lap dogs, restricted every other year to observing what we might perceive as wrongs instead of being able to right them.
Second, besides limiting our fiscal oversight, biennial budgeting would weaken fiscal discipline in Washington. Currently, Congress has the ability to review and approve Federal spending annually. By limiting that opportunity to affect fiscal oversight to every other year, Congress loses its ability to recapture monies not spent effectively or efficiently. Biennial budgeting will encourage inflated spending requests by federal agencies and departments, and Congress will have even less ability to reign in overall spending.
Third, biennial budgeting limits our ability to respond to our District's needs in a timely fashion. Currently, opportunities exist for Members to obtain needed funding for projects back home on an annual basis. Though a case is always made that discretionary spending is too high, imagine how the race for limited discretionary spending will intensify if budgeting decisions are made only every other year. Not only will the spending amount of requests be inflated, the competition to secure special project funding will intensify.
Fourth, biennial budgeting would trigger even more supplementals than are currently required. Revenue and spending projections are always wrong, regardless of their term. In fact, during my tenure on Appropriations I've witnessed projections off by as much as 30% over six months. Extending the budget process to two years extends these projections, almost ensuring a need for a rising number of supplementals. That will make the process even more chaotic and add to our already difficult job of sorting out competing needs on a government-wide basis.
Biennial budgeting will also strengthen the Senate's position in the process since Senate germaneness rules allow the attachment of a broad array of unrelated legislation to must-pass supplementals. We would virtually cede power to the Senate.
Finally, biennial budgeting would fail to decrease our budget workload, nor would it provide more time for sincere oversight. We only need to look at those states that practice biennial budgeting. While my home state of New York does not employ biennial budgeting, its legislative process does provide for automatic continuing resolutions. With such a process, there is no trigger that requires the conslusion of timely debate, deliberation, and approval of budgetary concerns. In fact, as of today, the New York State budget is 116 days past its deadline of April 1st with no end in sight. And lest you think that this year's impasse is an odd circumstance, note that it has been seventeen years since New York State passed its annual spending package on time.
Biennial budgeting would even further complicate our budget process. It allows more time for authorization and policy debate, but delays decision making. Biennial budgeting promotes gridlock instead of compromise. One only need look at the number of authorizing bills attached to their appropriations counterparts to realize that a budget deadline encourages decisiveness. My own experience as Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on VA/HUD and Independent Agencies has proven such. For the past several years, my Appropriations bill has been riddled with authorizing legislation that previously went unpassed.
In short, biennial budgeting will reduce Congressional compromise and cooperation, weaken Congressional oversight, and encourage gridlock. This proposal will not encourage timely decision making on key budgetary issues, but only delay it.
I thank you for considering my thoughts on this important matter and encourage your opposition to this proposal.
